Don’t Be Fooled by Big Tech’s Anti-China Sideshow


(*)(**)(***)At the House(****) Judiciary Committee (*****)hearing(******) on July (********************************************), Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, Apple’s Tim Cook, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, and Google’s Sundar Pichai each tried to defend their company against antitrust regulation by touting their values as an American corporation. Placed in opposition to this, for some, was an enemy more menacing than all of them: China.(*******)(**)Zuckerberg’s (********)written remarks(******) discussed China and a competition of global values. Bezos spoke of American workers delivering products to American customers. Cook said that “Apple is a uniquely American company whose success is only possible in this country.” Pichai (*********)wrote(******) that “just as American leadership in these areas is not inevitable, we know Google’s continued success is not guaranteed.” All the while, some Republican lawmakers (**********)rambled off(******) allegations that the companies’ work in China amounted to treason.(*******)(*)(**)WIRED OPINION(*******)(**)ABOUT(*******)(**)(***********)Justin Sherman(************) ((*************)@jshermcyber(******)) is an op-ed contributor at WIRED and a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative.(*******)(**************)(**)Proclamations of patriotism fed an implicit and at times explicit message of “don’t regulate us or we can’t compete with China.” But that framing is deliberately misleading. While the conversation should be about promoting free and open internet values simultaneously with democratic technology regulation—tech giants and politicians alike increasingly focus on the false choice between the two.(*******)(**)Tech companies have recently advanced the argument that regulation will only hinder the US’ ability to compete with Chinese firms. Much like wet clay, however, American tech giants have molded the specifics of this argument based on whatever suits the present circumstance.(*******)(**)For a while, this was a “data is the new oil” (***************)argument(******): Namely, privacy protections on US companies would mean “China” would (****************)win(******) the “AI race” because they have more access to this “oil.” Now, Big Tech molds its argument around free speech, or at least a frequently (*****************)self-serving(******) conception of it. Zuckerberg won much public attention in this vein last fall when he (******************)depicted(******) US internet companies, in their relatively unregulated forms, as a free-speech, open-internet counterbalance to technology companies based in China.(*******)(**)Puncturing this binary worldview is, well, reality: conflicting online speech mandates between countries; social media platforms which refuse to remove dangerous, democracy-harming lies just because they’re shared by politicians; and, all the while, a malleable “just complying with local laws” (*******************)claim(******) that may absurdly compare responses to law enforcement data requests in, say, an authoritarian country like Russia to that in a democracy like Germany. Not to mention (********************)Microsoft’s(******) and (*********************)Google’s(******) censored search engine pursuits in China, or Facebook speaking of human rights violations in China once it (**********************)gave up(******) on entering the Chinese market.(*******)(**)A somewhat pernicious techno-determinism pervades this discourse—an implication that the country in which a technology is developed impacts the technology’s susceptibility to abuse. Bluntly, some assume from this rhetoric that political governance in a technology’s country of origin is an indicator of “how oppressive it is.” The (***********************)technology(************************) underpinning social credit scoring in China, for example, must be “more prone to abuse” or “more evil” than that used, for instance, in (*************************)prison sentencing(******) in US courts. More research is needed on the subject, yet conclusion-jumping is used to give US firms a pass.(*******)(**)Though Facebook’s executives are the biggest purveyors of this narrative, they’re not the only beneficiaries. Amazon, Apple, Google, and other tech giants—like giants in many industries—also lobby aggressively in Washington and are well aware of the geopolitical moment. Congress and especially the Trump administration are paying close attention to Chinese technology companies’ growth, and concurrent concerns of Beijing’s influence on said entities. Leaning on those fears as reason to avoid regulating large US tech firms is a corporate strategy.(*******)(**)Yes, the notion of rule of law in the US is not comparable to that notion in Russia or Iran or China. Yes, there are real examples or risks of Chinese internet companies (**************************)censoring information(******) at the government’s behest, spreading propaganda, and spying on behalf of the regime. The Chinese government has made clear that it wants to (***************************)rewrite the rules(******) for global cyberspace, and that should concern all those who support or benefit from a relatively free and open internet underpinned by multi-stakeholder—not state-led—governance.(*******)(**************)